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THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MANAGEMENT HISTORY OF A SUCCESSFUL 
EXOTIC ERADICATION: THE CASE OF BLACK-TAILED JACKRABBITS IN ONE 
PART OF FLORIDA 
 
RICHARD M. ENGEMAN, National Wildlife Research Center, Fort Collins, Colorado, USA 
BERNICE CONSTANTIN, USDA/Wildlife Services, Gainesville, Florida, USA 
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Abstract: Black-tailed jackrabbits are a prolific, mobile species that became established at Miami 
International Airport, Florida. These animals posed a potential threat for colonization through additional parts 
of Florida if they were able to spread beyond the expansive airport property. Moreover, their carcasses from 
collisions with vehicles and aircraft attracted large scavenging and predatory birds to the airport, causing 
potential airstrike hazards. While the jackrabbits ultimately were successfully eradicated, the political, 
economic and management paths to that success were convoluted. We describe that history here and how a 
beneficial outcome was ultimately achieved. 
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 Black-tailed jackrabbits (Lepus californicus) are 
not native to Florida, but by 2003 they had been 
well-established at Miami International Airport 
(MIA) for many years. How and when they were 
introduced to this expansive airport property (1307 
ha) was unknown. Speculations as to their origins 
included escapes from a rabbit farm or escapes 
from transit to dog racing tracks for use in training 
greyhounds. By 2003, the black-tailed jackrabbit 
population at MIA was considered to be around 
500. 
 Occupation of the MIA property by a large 
number of black-tailed jackrabbits posed two 
potential threats. First, while MIA is relatively 
encapsulated by the Miami metro area, the 
jackrabbits still posed a significant invasive threat 
for other parts of Florida. The species is highly 
fecund, with 2-7 litters/year and 2-5 young/litter 
(Flinders and Chapman 2003). Moreover, they are a 
mobile, fast-moving species (up to 56 kph [Flinders 
and Chapman 2003]), and once outside the confines 
of Miami could spread through other parts of 
Florida (and potentially beyond). The other 
potential problem their population posed was to 
cause an increase in bird airstrike hazards. Black-
tailed jackrabbits were occasionally killed by 
collisions with aircraft and vehicles, or the back-
blast from jet engines. Their carcasses proved 
highly attractive to vultures (Cathartes aura, 
Coragyps atratus ) for forage. This created a 
considerable air safety concern, as vultures present 
significant hazards to aircraft while taking off or 
landing (e.g., Dolbeer et al. 2000). Besides safety 
concerns, bird strikes also result in lost revenue and 
very costly repairs to aircraft (Milsom and Horton 
1990, Linnell et al. 1996).  With the construction of 
a new runway, the problem was exacerbated by the 
decrease in green space the rabbits could occupy 
and an increase in space with aircraft and vehicular 
traffic that raised the number of killed rabbits. In 
fact, removal of the black-tailed jackrabbit 
population at MIA was instigated as a response to 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations 
mandating the problem be solved for safety 
reasons. From March 2001 to March 2003 at least 
two dozen vultures were struck by aircraft at MIA. 
We discuss the political aspects, operational 
methods and their chronologies that eventually led 
to eradication of black-tailed jackrabbits at MIA 
before they could further expand their range.  
 
DEVISING A PLAN 
 Suggestions for approaching the black-tailed 
jackrabbit problem were numerous. Miami’s 
Metrozoo called for their extermination, as they 
believed live-capture was unlikely to eliminate all 
animals. The FAA concurred and recommended 
 477
that the US Department of Agriculture, Wildlife 
Services (WS), the Federal agency responsible for 
managing conflicts with wildlife (US Department 
of Agriculture 1997), carry out the eradication. At 
the same time, animal rights activists strongly 
urged live-capture and transfer of the black-tailed 
jackrabbits to their native range. Additionally, the 
recommendations from the general public included 
fencing, shooting, poisoning, sterilization, and sale 
to dog breeders. At that time, there was an 
increasing trend in bird airstrikes at MIA. Between 
21 April and 21 August 2003, there were nine 
reported bird airstrikes at MIA. Most airports 
account for less than 20% of the actual number of 
strikes (Dolbeer et al. 1995). Wildlife strike 
statistics based on pilot reports generally are 
incomplete, because pilots either do not report 
strikes or the proportion of reported strikes varies 
due to factors such as decreased pilot acuity 
towards wildlife during critical phases of flight, 
size of the animal, group size, weather conditions, 
time of day, or heightened pilot awareness during 
migratory seasons (Linnell et al.1999). Thus, it is 
logical to assume that the same held true for MIA, 
and that more strikes may have occurred than have 
been reported.  
 The initial action plan by the Miami-Dade 
County Aviation Department (MDCAD), 
responsible for managing MIA, was to form an 
agreement with WS for the eradication of the black-
tailed jackrabbits. However, once the plans for 
lethal control became known to the public, there 
was a vociferous outcry, a media frenzy, and a 
public relations nightmare. This generated 
substantial political pressure to forestall the 
eradication and use non-lethal means to remove and 
relocate the black-tailed jackrabbits from MIA. 
  The eradication was temporarily rejected and a 
modified plan was introduced. This second action 
plan called for the black-tailed jackrabbits to be 
live-captured by a reputable private firm and 
housed for translocation to a sanctuary near 
Hutchins, Texas, where they are native. Finally, 
any black-tailed jackrabbits remaining at MIA after 
a 2-month capture period would be eradicated by 
various methods by the WS. 
 
PLAN IMPLEMENTATION AND 
DÉJÀ VU 
 Black-tailed jackrabbits were captured by 
several non-lethal methods including cage traps, 
hand capture (by hand or net), and tranquilization 
using dart guns. Nevertheless, a substantial number 
of black-tailed jackrabbits still remained at MIA 
when the time period for live-capture expired. This 
triggered the final stage of the plan, eradication of 
the remaining jackrabbits by WS. This in turn 
triggered another public outcry and a fight by 
animal activists to extend the time period in which 
the private contractor could live-trap black-tailed 
jackrabbits. Again, strong political pressure was 
built and eradication was delayed as the live-
capture methods were given another (third) month 
to succeed. In the meantime, concerns about the 
safety problems at MIA continued. 
 Black-tailed jackrabbits remained at MIA at the 
expiration of the extension of the live-capture 
period. By this time 301 black-tailed jackrabbits 
had been captured at MIA (210 by cage traps, 45 by 
hand capture, 46 by tranquilizer dart) and another 
34 inadvertently killed during capture attempts. 
Only 12-30 jackrabbits were claimed to remain at 
the end of this period (Rabin 2003a). The 
eradication portion of the action plan was again 
triggered. However, a strategy not completely 
successful on the ground might still succeed in 
court. Therefore, animal activist groups went to 
court to attempt to judicially impose more time for 
live-capture methods to succeed at complete black-
tailed jackrabbit removal. The animal activists lost 
their appeal in court with the ruling citing that 
continued delays would jeopardize public safety. At 
this point, black-tailed jackrabbit removal reverted 
to the original approach by MDCAD: eradication 
by WS. As this phase moved forward, it was 
accompanied by protests and dramatic headlines in 
newspapers. In contrast to the above assessment of 
the number of jackrabbits remaining, newspapers 
reported that WS removed 35 on the first night of 
shooting (Rabin 2003b). In reality, WS removed 44 
on the first night, 55 on the second night, and 172, 
overall, to complete the eradication. 
 
MANAGEMENT ECONOMICS 
 The agreement for WS to eradicate the black-
tailed jackrabbit at MIA was for 80 hrs of effort and 
a cost of $19,549. The initial estimate provided for 
live-capture and translocation of all black-tailed 
jackrabbit at MIA to Texas was about $7,500 
(Associated Press 2003). Ultimately, it cost in 
excess of $50,000 to live-capture and translocate 
about 60% (301) of the MIA black-tailed jackrabbit 
population to Texas. The cost per rabbit for live-
capture and translocation was, therefore, at least 
$166, whereas it cost $114 per rabbit to shoot the 
remainder. Moreover, as an animal removal 
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operation proceeds (by whatever methods), the 
amount of effort required per animal typically 
increases. The animals removed by WS were the 
last third of the population to be removed, thereby 
probably representing the most difficult portion of 
the population to eliminate. Because the WS 
contract was a fixed amount for black-tailed 
jackrabbit removal on airport property, we surmise 
that the cost per rabbit would have only been $39 
had they removed all of the jackrabbits. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 Florida joins Hawaii as the two states with the 
most severe invasive species problems in the 
United States (U.S. Congress 1993), with breeding 
populations of introduced or invasive vertebrate 
species regularly identified. The impacts from 
many introductions are unknown or not readily 
perceived by the public, while others are 
immediately apparent or have their negative 
potential revealed over time. Even highly prolific 
invasive species may fester for a considerable time 
before exhibiting an explosive expansion of their 
range (Shigesada and Kawasaki 1997). This was 
the case with the black-tailed jackrabbit at MIA. 
While their population anecdotally appeared to be 
in a relatively rapid increase phase, their true 
negative impacts to Florida’s habitats would only 
have occurred had they dispersed beyond Miami. 
Fortunately, their population was extirpated before 
this could take place. Nevertheless, the existence of 
this invasive species at MIA created a potential 
threat to human health and safety as well as an 
economic burden for the damage to aircraft.  
 Although surveys continue at MIA, the 
eradication of black-tailed jackrabbits at MIA does 
not mean vigilance for the species should not be 
maintained in Florida. One other breeding 
population of black-tailed jackrabbits (in Broward 
County) had existed and has been extirpated. They 
also have been observed in other parts of Florida, 
but not as breeding populations (Florida Wildlife 
Commission, unpublished data). Black-tailed 
jackrabbits could easily be illegally or accidentally 
released in Florida again. Should that happen, the 
experiences from the MIA eradication could 
provide direction on how an effective and efficient 
removal program could be conducted. 
 Management of an exotic species requires more 
than the recognition of a potential problem, it also 
requires a government and public motivation to 
address the problem. In the case of the black-tailed 
jackrabbit, the human safety issue motivated their 
removal, rather than their potential for ecological 
harm should they have dispersed from MIA. Had it 
not been for their exacerbation of airstrike hazards 
at MIA, it is unlikely they would have been 
eradicated and their population would have 
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